Essentially, any method of apportionment for the House must consider three key variables: 1 the number of House seats; 2 the number of U. A mathematical decision must also be made regarding how fractions of seats are addressed, since House seats must be allocated as whole numbers, and simple division methods are unlikely to produce this outcome for all or any states.
Because the Constitution does not specify a particular method for apportionment, several options have been considered and utilized throughout history. When determining apportionment, parameters could be set for the number of seats in the House, the population size of a district, or both. Based on the number of states and U. As a general principle, House size and district size are inversely related: a larger number of House seats means smaller population sizes for districts, and a smaller number of House seats means larger population sizes for districts.
Attempts by the Framers and various Congresses to address apportionment reveal a number of perspectives on how best to create a representative legislature, along with political and logistical considerations related to changes in the size of the House. An apportionment method prioritizing relatively equal district population size would establish a representation ratio, where there would be one Representative per x number of persons.
If the ratio remains the same across apportionment cycles, increases or decreases in the U. The representation ratio could also be adjusted to create larger or smaller districts, in order to limit the magnitude of changes to the overall size of the House. If states receive fractional allocations of House seats and there is no constraint on the size of the House, a simple rounding rule could be utilized to arrive at a whole number of seats for the House overall.
A general example of an apportionment approach prioritizing relatively equal district size follows:. Until the early 20 th century, the size of the House generally increased with each apportionment, due to the addition of new states and population growth, 72 but today, the number of House seats is set at by federal statute.
Yet concerns have also been raised that it would not be feasible to increase the House size apace with national population growth. To be sure that a particular apportionment conforms to a specified size of the House, each state must receive a whole number of seats, and the sum of all states' seats must equal the desired total House size.
Many apportionment approaches vary on how to address fractional seats, as remainders will often result when calculating state seat quotas.
A general example of an apportionment approach to reach a certain House size follows:. The following discussions provide an introduction to several methods that have been used for congressional apportionment in the United States. To illustrate how these methods work, for each method an imaginary example is provided in the accompanying table, in which the size of the House is fixed at 20 Members and the seats are divided among four states states A, B, C, and D with the populations specified in the tables.
President George Washington, however, exercised his first veto on the measure, in part, because the resulting apportionment calculations would have violated the requirement of at least 30, persons per district for multiple states.
Each state receives the whole number of seats in its quota, q , of seats. The remainders from q are rank-ordered from largest to smallest, and any additional House seats are apportioned to the states with the largest remainders. Table A Source: Adapted from U. Following the presidential veto of the Hamilton method, Congress adopted the Jefferson method of apportionment, which was used from to The Jefferson method for apportionment is based on a fixed House size, H , and each state's quota of seats, q , is rounded down to the nearest whole number.
Often, the sum of the rounded-down q values is less than H. When this occurs, divisor values smaller than d are tested until an adjusted divisor, d adj , is found that results in a set of q values which, when rounded down, sum to H.
Jefferson Method—Sample Apportionment. Step 1: Find seats if apportioned using initial divisor, d round down any q remainder. Step 2: Apportion seats using adjusted divisor, d adj a.
The regular divisor, d , is often used as a starting point to inform what values could work for an adjusted divisor, d adj. Here, is used as the adjusted divisor value, but any integer between or would also produce a series of q values that, when rounded down, sum to the total House size of 20 seats.
Some believed that the Jefferson method favored large states, and the Webster method was an approach first used for apportionment in and last used for apportionment following the census. Each state receives the whole number of seats in its quota, q ; then, q remainders greater than or equal to 0. The example provided in Table A-3 happens to result in the same number of House seats as the other examples in this appendix, which treat the House size, H , as fixed at 20 seats, but performing these initial calculations under the Webster method could result in a subsequent adjustment to the number of House seats.
Webster Method—Sample Apportionment. In addition to treating large and small states similarly, some have also believed that an apportionment method should minimize percentage differences in district population sizes across states as much as possible.
The method of equal proportions, also known as the Huntington-Hill method, seeks to achieve this objective, and has been used for all House apportionments since This method differs from the Webster method by rounding up remainders for a state's quota, q , at the geometric mean, G , rather than at the arithmetic mean. The geometric mean is found by multiplying two successive numbers together, then taking the square root of their product; here, the successive numbers represent a state's q rounded down to the nearest whole number its "lower" quota and a state's q rounded up to the nearest whole number its "upper" quota.
Each state receives its "lower" quota of seats and then may receive an additional seat if its quota, q , is greater than or equal to its geometric mean, G. Huntington-Hill Method—Sample Apportionment. Step 1: Find lower quota round down any q remainder and upper quota round up any q remainder. The initial calculation for a state's quota, q , under the method of equal proportions, is made by using the "ideal" district size, d , as the divisor.
Table A-4 provides a sample apportionment in which the sum of the rounded geometric means happens to result in the desired House size, H , of 20 seats, but, in practice, this often does not occur.
If the sum of the rounded geometric means for each state does not result in the desired number of House seats, there is an additional step: seats can be apportioned using a priority list , which essentially ranks each state's claim to the "next" House seat apportioned i. To generate a priority list, each state's apportionment population is multiplied by a series of multiplier values. The multiplier values are created using the reciprocal of the geometric mean associated with each potential successive seat number for the state above its constitutionally mandated first seat.
Priority Values a. Corresponding Priority List Ranking b. Each priority value is calculated by multiplying the state's apportionment population by a multiplier, representing the reciprocal geometric mean of the last seat apportioned and the next seat to be apportioned.
For a list of multipliers, see U. In this table, priority values are rounded to the nearest whole number. Values italicized and in bold represent the 16 remaining seats to be apportioned, after each state receives one seat as constitutionally required and assuming a House size of Larger values in this table are not consecutive because this table only includes rankings associated with the first nine additional seats to be apportioned.
Larger states could be ranked higher and entitled to additional seats above nine before smaller states receive any additional seats. In this example, if the priority list table continued to display values for additional seats, State D would be ranked 19 th and would receive its 10 th seat before State B receives its 7 th seat ranked 20 th ; State D is also ranked 21 st and would receive its 11 th seat before State A receives its 6 th seat ranked 22 nd.
CRS calculations based on information provided in Karen M. See Table 3 for further information on average congressional district sizes since Kristen D. Historical information dating back to on state seat gains and losses, as well as the average number of people per representative in each state, is available from U.
Census Bureau, " Apportionment of the U. Article I, Section 2, clause 3, originally stated, "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Article 1, Section 2, provides that a first census would be taken within three years of the first meeting of Congress, and until the population was formally enumerated by a census, there would be 65 House Members, allocated among New Hampshire 3 , Massachusetts 8 , Rhode Island 1 , Connecticut 5 , New York 6 , New Jersey 4 , Pennsylvania 8 , Delaware 1 , Maryland 6 , Virginia 10 , North Carolina 5 , South Carolina 5 , and Georgia 3. For one overview of provisions contained in various apportionment acts, see Emanuel Celler, "Congressional Apportionment—Past, Present, and Future," Law and Contemporary Problems , vol.
Copies of past apportionment acts are available from the U. This excludes the nonvoting House seats held by Delegates and the Resident Commissioner; Article I, Section 2, and resulting apportionment practices, only address Representatives from U.
The apportionment act P. The next enacted apportionment bill was the Permanent Apportionment Act of P. The enabling acts for Alaska and Hawaii statehood provided temporary increases in the size of the House to provide seats for the new states until the next regular reapportionment, and as a result, the House had seats between and See P. Similar provisions were contained in the Permanent Reapportionment Act of For further discussion of who is included in apportionment population counts, see U.
For example, see U. Census Bureau, "U. The method of equal proportions is sometimes referred to as the Huntington-Hill method. Prior to the act, other apportionment methods could be used; one such alternative used in several reapportionments was the Webster method.
Generally, these apportionment methods vary in how they approach fractional seat entitlements and what rounding points should be used in order to distribute those fractions of seats across states. For a discussion of alternate mathematical approaches, see U.
A geometric mean is the square root of the product of two successive numbers multiplied by each other; the reciprocal of a geometric mean is 1 divided by the geometric mean. To find the "multiplier" for each state's second seat, for example, the geometric mean of 1 and 2 would be used; 1 multiplied by 2 equals 2, and the square root of 2 is 1.
The reciprocal of this geometric mean would be 1 divided by 1. For discussion on the method of equal proportions, and tables with multipliers and priority values for previous apportionments, see U.
The statute is written to apply to the first regular session of the 82 nd Congress "and of each fifth Congress thereafter. This report is not intended to be a legal analysis. For further discussion, see Jeanne C. Michael Wines, "What Is Gerrymandering?
Friedman and Richard T. Table 1 provides information on which states gained and lost seats following the census, and Table 2 provides additional historical data on the number of states and House seats affected by each apportionment since The requirement for single-member districts had previously appeared in the Apportionment Act of June 25, , 5 Stat.
For additional history, see Erik J. Examples include a requirement for equal population size "as nearly as practicable" "An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives to Congress among the several States according to the ninth Census," February 2, , 17 Stat.
Some of these provisions appeared in several subsequent apportionment bills. The following resources provide examples of some current legal challenges but may not represent a comprehensive account of all cases. Historical apportionment acts can be viewed at U. Burnett, Congressional Apportionment: , U. See also Drew Desilver, "U. See also U. For an overview of how certain criteria have been applied over time, see Micah Altman, "Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs.
Reality," Social Science History , vol. For additional background on compactness as a redistricting principle, see William Bunge, "Gerrymandering, Geography, and Grouping," Geographical Review , vol. Siegel, "Geographic Compactness vs. Niemi et al. Polsby and Robert D. In , the term was coined to describe a salamander-shaped state legislative district in Massachusetts that benefitted Governor Elbridge Gerry's party.
For general historical background and an analysis of state redistricting timeline considerations, see Erik J. A number of lawsuits related to redistricting following the census remain pending in ; see David A. Catherine McCully, "Table 3. For an illustration of the timeline of how redistricting processes unfolded across states following the apportionment, see the chart created by Justin Levitt, "When Are the Lines Drawn?
Justin Levitt and Michael P. Such bills from the th Congress included H. Bills from the th Congress that would have required states to use redistricting commissions included H. Some of the bills related to redistricting commissions also discuss measures to provide for public input and transparency regarding the redistricting process.
Other bills have included provisions to include public participation in redistricting processes, but would not require states to use redistricting commissions. These bills included H. The structure of these commissions varies by state. Virginia, for example, six legislators and six independent citizens are appointed to its commission.
Finally, nine states —Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, New York, and Washington—give independent commissions control over the congressional redistricting process. Members of these commissions cannot be legislators or elected officials, and state laws limit participation by public officials in the redistricting process. All these states except Colorado and New York ban commission members from running for office for several years in districts they draw.
Finally, state legislatures in New York and Washington can override their commissions with a supermajority. As with congressional redistricting, most U. In 34 states , legislatures control over state-level redistricting occurs, though how state legislative district lines are drawn differs from congressional redistricting. In addition to who leads the congressional redistricting process, state and federal authorities set legal requirements and guidelines to reduce partisan redistricting and protect racial minorities, ethnic groups, and other communities of interest.
Article 1, Section 2 of the U. Supreme Court has read this to mean that congressional districts must contain approximately the same number of people. In addition to the U. Constitution, 14 states apply the same principle to congressional districts.
The next most important rules governing the redistricting process address minority representation. The Federal Voting Rights Act of prohibited district lines that disempower minority populations, although the Supreme Court has since severely weakened federal enforcement of these rules. One result of the Voting Rights Act is the presence of majority-minority congressional districts i. Outside of federal law, only four states apply the same criteria to congressional redistricting.
Another near-universal rule for the redistricting process is contiguity. An electoral district is contiguous if one can travel from any point in the district to any other point without having to cross its boundary.
Some exceptions to the contiguity rule are permitted by federal courts if a reasonable context exists, such as separation by rivers, lakes, or seas. Besides federal legal requirements, 18 states require contiguity for congressional districts.
Thus, as in , the likely outcome in New Mexico is a redistricting plan that will be favorable to the Democrats and weaken the influence of rural interests. Utah is the only state in the region where conditions exist e. Similarly, maps for state legislative districts increase the number of seats that favor the GOP and, in many instances, protect incumbents from potential primary challengers by dividing communities into multiple districts.
Reapportionment and redistricting are often regarded as the most political activities in the United States; an expectation that is certainly being realized across the Mountain West. In the swing states where legislators draw the maps for example, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico but where state government is divided, partisan considerations loomed large, causing all of these states to conclude all or parts of their redistricting processes in the courts. In one-party Idaho and Utah, the politics of space were at issue.
Geographic constraints on district boundaries imposed through statute and the Idaho constitution ensured that more rural seats were preserved and that the growing influence of urban interests will be checked. In Utah, Republicans moved in the opposite direction by carving up the very communities from which they are elected in order to implement a partisan gerrymander.
Another school of thought, however, argues that the most typical redistricting outcome is not partisan gain or loss, but an uncertainty that shakes up the state political environment and facilitates political renewal.
In the case of the Mountain West, there is evidence to support that claim as well. The biggest source of uncertainty will continue to be growth. While the economic downturn has slowed migration to the region, the Mountain West states remain poised to keep expanding in a manner that will further concentrate and diversify their populations.
At the state level, with the exception of Idaho, the most significant consequence will be a reduction in rural influence. The combination of term limits in Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado, small legislative chambers, and fast growing urban populations will continue to decrease the number of entrenched rural legislators and the number of stand-alone rural districts.
Consequently, urban interests should be positioned to align state policy with demographic reality. The void created by the demise of rural legislators will be filled by minorities, particularly Hispanics. To date, the increased political activism of Hispanic communities across the region has primarily benefited Democrats; helped in no small part by the hard-line rhetoric and policies championed by some Mountain West Republicans.
Thus, with or without Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, minority legislators, primarily Hispanics, will increase their ranks significantly. Nationally, the impact of reapportionment and redistricting is mixed.
Certainly, the addition of three U. House seats after the census will give more voice to regional issues in Washington D. Senate is likely to decline in the near term. Bush narrowly winning all three in and Democrat Barack Obama flipping them blue in by wider margins. Obviously, Idaho and Utah will remain out of reach for the Democrats in statewide contests for some time. Thus, continued investment in Arizona and throughout the region will allow the Democrats to further expand the number of Mountain West states in play while forcing the GOP to spend resources to defend turf that it once could safely call its own.
Endnotes [i] U. Senate seats changed parties in The Colorado Redistricting Commission CRC , which oversees redistricting for state legislative districts, consists of 11 members: four of whom are picked by the party leaders of the General Assembly; three who are selected by the governor; and four who are chosen by the Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. The Idaho Citizen Commission for Reapportionment ICCR consists of six members, four of whom are chosen by party leaders of the Idaho Legislature and one member chosen by each of the state chairs for the Democratic and Republican parties.
Only the member New Mexico Senate exceeds the national average chamber size. The lower chamber of the Utah legislature could be expanded as it is presently below its constitutional cap. Arizona and Nevada set the sizes of their legislatures by statute. In both instances, the provisions of the Voting Rights Act have the perverse effect of increasing symbolic representation for minority groups while decreasing the number of legislators who may be receptive to minority interests.
See, Kevin A. House seat — a position clearly at odds with the holding in Shaw v. Reno U.
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