Should i intervene

Third, it cannot be applied to cases involving what Ed Page , p. Specifically, it is unable to account for historical injustices committed by past generations. If one adopts an individualist perspective, according to which the duties of states derive from the duties of its individual citizens, historical responsibility will be unable to point to anyone in cases where those responsible are no longer alive.

This limitation is clearly relevant for the case of humanitarian intervention, as the historical genesis of at least some cases of mass atrocities is linked to acts of colonialism committed by people that are long since dead. Historical responsibility is also vulnerable to two objections that are more specific to the case of humanitarian intervention. First, it is far from obvious that states that are historically responsible for the atrocities also have the ability to intervene effectively.

We have to ask whether it would make sense to assign the duty to intervene to a country whose military capacity is severely limited. Doing so would risk defeating the purpose of the intervention, which is to save as many lives as possible.

A second objection is that historically responsible states will be especially unsuited to intervene seeing as they might face higher levels of resistance from the local population and might therefore be less effective. Footnote 20 If this objection is sound, there would be little more to say for the role of historical responsibility in this context. Yet, while this objection might sometimes apply, empirical research on this particular question is scarce.

It is certainly conceivable that there are cases where the objection does not hold. So far we have seen that historical responsibility offers the opportunity to take into account the role of outside states in the occurrence of atrocities. In this sense it seems that it can help solve a central problem with the principle of Ability , namely that it is completely ahistorical. But we have also seen that there are important limitations in the scope of the principle.

But notice that there is a second way in which historical considerations may be invoked. Footnote 22 For example, a state may have built its capacity for intervention based on proceeds from the selling of arms to corrupt and rights-violating regimes. States whose capacity for intervention has come about in such ways will have their complaints against taking remedial action undermined.

Historical taint : If a state or set of states has built its ability to intervene on resources that result from rights-violations, then that state or set of states has a weaker claim to reject the burden of intervention. Goodin , pp. Historical taint thus allows us to appeal to the significance of history even in cases where historical responsibility does not apply, such as cases involving intergenerational injustice.

It is worth noting that historical responsibility and historical taint may operate at the same time. But although historical responsibility and historical taint may focus on the same injustice, this is not necessary. For historical taint there is no requirement that there be a causal connection between the duty-bearer and the atrocities that motivate the intervention, and in this sense it clearly differs from historical responsibility.

Some may perceive this as a weakness. In other words: is it required that the resources used to intervene against mass killing in state A stem from the same injustice that caused the mass killing e. I do not deny that our intuition about taint may be stronger in cases where there is a common source, such as when we say that the resources that go into stopping a war should be gathered from those who have benefitted from the preconditions of that particular war. However, it stands to reason that a state whose capacity for intervention is built on the proceeds of its arms sales to a rights-violating regime will have its claim to these resources undermined regardless of the identity of the regime with which it has been dealing.

It is time to take stock. In this section we have seen that there are two ways in which historical injustices may be used to complement the principle of Ability in undermining the claims of states not to intervene. But we have also seen that there are limitations as to where they apply, albeit more so for historical responsibility than for historical taint. In particular, both principles are vulnerable to the objection that they may point to states that lack the ability to intervene effectively.

How, then, should historical responsibility and historical taint be weighed against Ability? This is the topic of the next section. Given that Ability, historical responsibility and historical taint are widespread and attach to many states, it is important to determine how these factors should be combined.

Consider an example where states A and B are equal in terms of ability, but where A is historically responsible. In such a case we should say that A has the weaker claim not to intervene, and should therefore be assigned a stronger duty to intervene. We do, however, want to avoid the conclusion that historical responsibility can outweigh Ability. In a case where A is historically responsible, but slightly less able than B, we do not want to say that it is A that has the weakest claim not to intervene this is consistent with saying that A has other remedial duties or duties of compensation.

Due to the importance of saving lives, effectiveness should not be traded off in the case of humanitarian intervention. The same goes a fortiori for historical taint. Still, one might think that historically responsible states can be required to bear greater costs, and can therefore be asked to contribute in ways that for non-responsible states would be supererogatory.

However, this idea is more plausible if historical responsibility is seen as a matter of rectificatory justice. On the entitlement undermining view that I adopt the idea has rather less purchase, seeing as no special weight is assigned to the idea of responsible states making up for past wrongdoing. Instead I propose that the role of historical responsibility and historical taint is to act as tie-breakers. After all, it sounds quite unlikely that any two states would be exactly tied when it comes to their ability to intervene.

Despite this, the charge of irrelevance is mistaken. In order to show this, I must specify what I mean by states being equally able, and hence what it is that characterises a tie. A tie in terms of ability should be understood as a situation where the difference between two or more states is such that choosing one state rather than another would not make a difference for the victims, measured in protection of basic human rights.

In other words, the states can make a similar contribution without this compromising the overall effectiveness of the intervention. We might call this a functional tie to keep this idea distinct. To illustrate, consider a case where states A, …, E have been picked out as the most able to undertake an intervention. D is historically responsible for the case at hand. A, …, E differ in ability in descending order, and C therefore has a higher score on factors that bear on ability to intervene than D.

Thus, C and D are sufficiently similar to make this pair a functional tie. The same argument can be made with respect to costs. For states that are functionally tied, the costs they would face in protecting the victims can act as a tie-breaker.

Naturally, this raises the question of how costs, historical responsibility, and historical taint should be weighed relative to each other. They all come in degrees and it is not obvious that any one of them should have lexical priority. It seems, therefore, that their relative weights should be determined case-by-case. On the other hand, it seems implausible that small changes in welfare can outweigh the importance of historical responsibility and taint.

It is therefore likely that historical responsibility will apply in addition to, rather than in competition with, historical taint.

Moreover, distributive unfairness provides a defeasible reason for states to reject the burden of intervention. It is important, therefore, to highlight how my account can accommodate distributive fairness among the group of potential interveners. Ability , historical responsibility and historical taint all come in degrees and are moreover differentially distributed among states.

Fairness requires that we take this into account. The history-sensitive ability-account incorporates this insight. Hence, my view suggests that a state that is twice as able as another should, ceteris paribus , take on twice the burden.

The focus on proportionality is, I would argue, not only inherent in the factors themselves Ability, historical responsibility, historical taint , but can also be derived from a familiar account of fairness.

The emphasis on distributive fairness speaks in favour of my account for three main reasons: first, fairness is important in itself. Second, fair burden-sharing has instrumental importance in that it can help alleviate the undersupply of intervention.

Having more states share in the burden of intervention will lower the costs each state faces, and thus removes an important disincentive for prospective interveners. Footnote 27 Third, empirical research indicates that increased diversity in missions contributes to increased effectiveness Bove and Ruggeri In sum, fair burden-sharing is not only morally important in itself, but also instrumentally valuable given the goal of saving the victims.

In other words, if we care about effective intervention, we should also care about distributive fairness among potential interveners. Given its focus on proportionality, my account might face the objection that it is impracticable. The objection is that this would not work due to the operational problems that tend to arise when a significant number of states work together in military operations.

Hence, distributing the burden among a large number of states might be detrimental to the prospects for success. But note that this objection builds on a misunderstanding of what my account entails.

While it is probably true that having too many states take part in the intervention would be bad, this is not a problem for my account.

This is due to the fact that the burden that my account seeks to distribute is defined on the basis of what it takes to realise the goal of saving the victims effectively. Far from suggesting that the duty to intervene should be distributed proportionally among all states that have some degree of the relevant properties such as Ability , proportionality should be interpreted to mean proportionality among as many states as possible without compromising mission effectiveness.

This is because the goal of saving the victims is ultimately of paramount importance. Someone might object that, while my account is right to focus on distributive fairness, the focus on proportionality should be substituted by a scheme whereby states alternate from time to time in taking on the burdens of intervention. It might be argued that this would be equally fair, more feasible, and good for international cooperation.

However, while such a scheme of diachronic fairness would be an improvement over the status quo, the proposal should be rejected for the following reasons: first, given that humanitarian interventions are rare events, it would likely take a very long time to achieve a fair outcome.

It is unlikely that diachronic fairness could be achieved within a single generation. Second, states may not trust other states to take on their fair share in the future, and this might make them less inclined to pick up the cost in the present.

Third, given the rather static distribution of capacity for intervention among states, it is not clear that different interveners can be chosen on each occasion without compromising the effectiveness of interventions. This is primarily determined by ability to intervene, and for reasons of distributive fairness we should prefer interventions that have more contributing states, up to the point where the overall effectiveness of the intervention would be harmed by adding further actors.

Where states are functionally tied, costs, historical responsibility and historical taint act as tie-breakers. Finally, it should be pointed out that there is more to humanitarian intervention than the task of prosecuting the war.

Several theorists have alluded to the point that we can accommodate concerns of fairness by having some states undertake the intervention while others contribute in other ways, such as by providing funding and material resources Fabre , pp.

Such solutions would go some way towards alleviating any remaining concerns we may have about distributive fairness, but I cannot develop this part of the overall picture here. In this paper I have examined how the duty to undertake humanitarian intervention should be assigned to particular states.

Against this background I proposed that the duty to undertake humanitarian intervention should be assigned to states in inverse proportion to their claim not to intervene, as determined by ability to intervene, costs, historical responsibility and historical taint.

However, costs and historical concerns should play a role only when it would not compromise the effectiveness of interventions. See e. I'd been making excuses for him all night long, thinking he was accidentally brushing up against me over and over again.

I was irate but couldn't find any words in the moment. Sugars, I feel a responsibility to tell his girlfriend that he touched me inappropriately.

If my partner were groping women without their consent I'd want to know. I'm scared that this occurrence was not unusual for him, especially given how casual his apology was.

My fear is that he thinks it's OK to do things like this and he'll continue to do them. I don't want his girlfriend to get hurt. I also want to tell the groper how angry I am and how offensive his actions were. I was sexually assaulted recently and I'm still recovering. I already feel small and him touching me in this way made me feel so powerless and stupid. I have notes drafted to both of them but when I actually think about sending them I get nauseous.

Groper and his girlfriend have moved in together and are most likely getting engaged soon. They're moving across the country together in a few months.

She seems so happy and I was excited for the two of them until last night. Do I hope this was a one-time, bizarre occurrence and let it slide? I'm scared to stir things up even though I know what groper did was wrong. I would love to know what you two think is the right thing to do. I'm pretty sure the right thing to do is to tell the gropers girlfriend about the incident but I'm scared that I'm blowing things out of proportion and that I'm going to ultimately bring more harm than good to all three of us.

Thank you for any light you can shed on the matter. Signed, Groped Steve Almond: Groped, my advice is to tell the girlfriend exactly what happened. The reason I think you know somewhere inside of yourself that you have to do that is it's not just that the girlfriend could get hurt, it's that you were hurt and that other women could get hurt.

What I think you need to be very clear about--and I think you should meet in person, not in a note, not on the phone.

You need to be very clear about exactly what you can remember: everybody was drinking, it was a party, all you owe her is the truth. Be as clear in your own mind about what happened to the extent you can recall and why you reacted to it in the way that you did. She just needs to know this guy was touching you in a way that was not OK, repeatedly. Cheryl Strayed: Groped, I think you should tell them both, in whatever way feels comfortable to you, whether that be an e-mail, a letter, together, separately.

And I don't think it's really about intervening in their relationship. I think it's about your right to speak your truth, to say you touched me inappropriately, you grabbed my ass. It's not OK. And I think that that's a very clear thing. And you should really stop feeling kind of weird about not saying something in the moment.

Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter. Please, subscribe or login to access full text content. To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us. All Rights Reserved. OSO version 0. University Press Scholarship Online. Sign in. Recent Examples on the Web Councilman Fred Richardson, however, said the council should not intervene with the District 2 seat until at least after the runoff election on October 5.

First Known Use of intervene , in the meaning defined at sense 1. Learn More About intervene. Time Traveler for intervene The first known use of intervene was in See more words from the same year.

Style: MLA. Kids Definition of intervene. Legal Definition of intervene. McLaughlin , N. Freund — compare implead , interplead , join. Get Word of the Day daily email!